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Abstract 
Kenya needs substantial and sustained fiscal consolidation to create fiscal space for financing the 
government’s election pledges, the Vision 2030 development projects, and sustainable development 
goals. However, the government has found it hard to sustain its fiscal consolidation attempts. This 
study investigates the fiscal consolidation constraints that act through the budget imbalance dynamics 
in Kenya using the Olivera-Tanzi effect approach. The study covers the period 2000-2015 using time 
series data and employs three Auto-regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) error correction models in the 
analysis. The study showed that a rise in the general price levels in the economy, adjustment of 
minimum wages, rise in perceived levels of corruption in the public sector and the political budget 
cycles (occurrence of a general election) worsen the budget imbalances (deficits) thus constrain fiscal 
consolidation efforts in Kenya. The study also demonstrated that budget imbalance dynamics in Kenya 
could partly be explained by the Olivera-Tanzi proposition. The study recommends measures to reduce 
the fiscal imbalance gap in Kenya, which include controlling both supply and demand side inflationary 
pressure and dealing with rent seeking behavior in the public sector. 
Keywords 
Budget imbalance dynamics, fiscal consolidation, government expenditure, government revenue, 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Background  
Since Kenya attained its independence, its fiscal policy stance has been largely expansionary. Kenya’s 
Economic survey data show that the total government expenditure as a percentage share of the GDP at 
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current market prices has averaged at 33.7 percent annually from fiscal year (FY) 1999/2000 to FY 
2017/2018, registering a low of 27.6 percent in 2012/2013 and an estimated high of 35.9 percent in 
2017/2018. The Economic survey data also show that total nominal government expenditure rose 
tenfold from KSh 225.7 billion (about $2.2 billion) in 1999/2000 to Ksh 2,330.0 billion (approximately 
$23.1 billion) in FY 2017/2018. Kenya’s Budget Statement for 2018/2019 shows that total government 
spending increased to Ksh 2,556.6 billion (approximately $25.3 billion) in FY 2018/2019.  
Expansionary budgets lead to increased pressure for government borrowing, thus contributes to the 
fiscal consolidation challenges in a country. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) (2016), the overall budget deficit for Africa (including grants) worsened from -4.8 
percent of GDP in 2014 to -6.6 percent of GDP in 2015. The African Development Bank (2018) shows 
that the budget deficit in Africa further worsened to 7.0 percent in 2016 but estimates it to have 
declined to 5.7 percent in 2017. AfDB et al. (2016) and AfDB (2018) show that the overall budget 
deficits (including grants) as a percentage of GDP for the entire East Africa region has deteriorated 
from -4 percent in 2013 to -4.6 percent in 2015, then registered a slight improvement to -4.2 percent in 
2016 and is estimated to be at -3.9 percent in 2017. A closer look at the averages of the budget deficit to 
GDP ratios reported by AfDB et al. (2016) and AfDB (2018) over the last five years (since 2013) 
indicates that, apart from South Sudan that faces internal instability, Kenya is the next worse 
performing nation in the region. Kenya’s budget deficit as a percentage of the GDP averaged at 7.2 
percent for the period 2013-2017 which is above the EAC region’s average of 4.1 percent and Africa’s 
average of 5.5 percent. From the estimated 7.2 percent of GDP in the FY 2017/18, Kenya’s Budget 
Statement for financial year 2018/2019 noted that the government projects the fiscal deficit to narrow 
to 5.7 percent of GDP in the FY 2018/19 and to 3.0 percent of GDP by FY 2021/2022 under the fiscal 
consolidation plan.  
Moreover, growth in government revenue has been stagnant over the period, oscillating between a low 
of 9.3 percent in 2011/2012 and a high of 21.8 percent in 2012/2013. Kenya’s narrow tax base which 
largely relies on income taxes (about 40 percent of total revenue and 8 percent of GDP), and Value - 
Added Tax (VAT) which constitutes about 25 percent of total revenue (World Bank, 2015) makes it 
difficult for the government to pursue tax-based fiscal consolidations. Additionally, there has been 
limited revenue raising efforts by the local county governments, with the counties collecting only 43 
percent of the targeted own-source revenue, hence increasing the pressure for more national 
government transfers (World Bank, 2015). Consequently, the persistent budget deficits have led to 
increased government borrowing, which has remained on an expansionary path since 2004. 
Budget deficits have been the focus of fiscal and macroeconomic adjustments in view of the economic 
ills associated with them. The economic ills mainly derive from the ways of financing budget deficits, 
especially when excessively employed. For instance, financing the budget deficits through domestic 
borrowing may crowd out private investment and consumption (Mashakada, 2013; Easterly & 
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Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991) whereas financing through foreign borrowing may lead to current account 
deficits (Easterly & Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991). These macroeconomic imbalances may further limit the 
fiscal consolidation efforts in a country. Figure 1 shows how Kenya financed its budget deficit between 
the FY 2010/2011 and 2017/2018.  
 
 
Figure 1. Budget Deficit Financing in Kenya 
Data Source: Republic of Kenya (2014, 2016, 2017, 2018). 
 
The figure shows that the main sources of deficit financing in Kenya are domestic borrowing (with an 
annual average of 30.8 percent financing over the period) and external/foreign loans (with an annual 
average of 36.5 percent financing over the same period). In the financial year 2013/2014 and 
2014/2015, Kenya financed 6.4 percent and 22.4 percent of its deficit respectively using international 
sovereign bond. In the reviewed period, the external grants have financed an annual average of 4.8 
percent of the deficit. Key to note is that a substantial proportion of the deficit (about 24.4 percent 
annual average over the reviewed period) is financed through other sources, which is not clearly 
documented in the data source used. These other sources could include monetization of the budget 
deficit and/or drawing down on foreign exchange reserves. Monetization (money creation) of the 
budget deficit may increase the base money in an economy, which further generates inflationary 
pressure (Mashakada, 2013; Easterly & Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991). Possible monetization of the deficit 
means that part of the deficit financing is through seigniorage (viewed as an inflation tax on the public). 
This informs use of the Olivera-Tanzi effect theory in analysis of the budget imbalance dynamics in the 
country. Olivera (1967) modeled an increase in size of budget deficits that results from inflation when 
public expenditure is related to current price level, but government revenues are related to the previous 
price level, as a result of lags in tax collections. Tanzi (1978) noted that it is always not possible for tax 
payments to be made to the tax authorities at the same time that the taxable activity occurs. Therefore, 
there will always be time lags before the tax is paid.  
In view of the macroeconomic imbalances that may be generated by the budget deficits, it is important 
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to control their expansionary pressure in an economy. To this end, it is necessary to understand the 
factors behind the expansionary budget imbalance dynamics. The available literature shows that budget 
imbalances respond to various factors that can be categorized into: economic factors such as inflation 
(Olivera, 1967; Tanzi, 1977; Aghevli & Khan, 1978; Heller, 1980); political economy factors such as 
type of government (Alesina & Drazen, 1991) and strategic debt accumulation (Alesina & Tabellini, 
1990a); structural factors such as the tax reforms (Muriithi & Moyi, 2003); tax revenue performance 
(Wawire, 1991, 2006, 2017); and demographic factors (Painter & Bae, 2001; Sanz & Velázquez, 2001; 
Wawire, 2006, 2017). Since budget imbalances seem to respond to various factors, it is of interest to 
investigate the factors that are majorly responsible for the budget imbalance dynamics in Kenya. It is 
against this backdrop that this paper sought to provide a broad analysis of budget imbalance dynamics 
in Kenya. The paper examines the factors that simultaneously influence rise in government spending 
while at the same time limiting growth in government revenue. Further, it looks at how these factors 
directly influence the budget imbalance dynamics in the country. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
In the Vision 2030 economic blueprint, Kenya aims at maintaining its budget deficit (including grants) 
to an average of about 3 percent of GDP over the period (Republic of Kenya, 2007). However, Kenya 
remains a perpetual casualty of expansionary budget deficits. Over the period under study (2000-2015), 
Kenya’s persistent budget deficits (including grants) has increased from 3.86 percentage share of GDP 
in the year 2000 to 13.11 percentage share of the GDP in 2015, which is far from the target of 3 percent 
envisioned in the Vision 2030 blueprint. Since 2012, the budget deficits (including grants) have 
worsened from 6.48 percentage share of GDP to 9.73 percentage share of GDP in 2014 and finally to 
13.11 percent in 2015. This is despite the government attempts to carry out fiscal adjustments and 
efforts to improve on domestic revenue mobilization.  
The persistent growth in the budget deficits is worrying due to the pressure it is generating for 
additional government borrowing and the associated economic ills. For instance, fiscal deficits are 
responsible for an assortment of ills such as high inflation rates, over indebtedness and crowding out of 
the private sector investments (Gongera, Mindila, Nyakwara, & Ouma, 2013). These further constrain 
fiscal consolidation efforts in the country. The consequences of the persistent budget deficits call for an 
analysis of the factors behind the fiscal imbalance dynamics in the country. Identifying and coming up 
with control measures to reduce effects of these factors, some of which may be discretionary, would 
help to limit the associated economic ills and provide a supportive macroeconomic environment for 
successful and sustainable fiscal consolidation in the country. 
1.3 Study Objectives 
The main objective of this study was to examine the budget imbalance dynamics in Kenya. Specifically, 
the study sought to: 
(i) Analyze the budget imbalance dynamics in Kenya 
(ii) Examine the extent at which Olivera-Tanzi effect theory explains the budget imbalance dynamics 
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in Kenya 
In pursuit of Kenya’s development agenda, budget deficits may be unavoidable. However, there are 
factors that may lead to an increase in size of budget deficits, making it a challenge for policymakers to 
ensure fiscal discipline and macroeconomic stability thus yielding undesirable consequences in the 
economy. This study takes a broad perspective empirically to examine the underlying factors behind 
Kenya’s budget imbalance dynamics. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the second section 
reviews the available literature; the third section explains the methodology used; the fourth section 
presents the empirical results and discussions of the results; and the last section concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review  
The dynamics of budget imbalances in both developed and developing countries can be explained using 
various theories. First, the Keynesian theory postulates that a rise in budget deficits, increases 
aggregate demand in an economy, which may stimulate investment and growth under conditions of less 
than full employment (Mashakada, 2013). In doing so, Mashakada (2013) explained that the Keynesian 
model assumes that the economy is not at full employment level of production, that there exists a 
substantial number of liquidity constrained economic participants and that consumption is related to 
current income. The combination of these three assumptions leads to a positive effect of a rise in the 
budget deficit on consumption, investment and consequently output. To the extent that government and 
private debt do not compete for households’ savings, budget deficits stimulate aggregate demand and 
provide policymakers with a means to offset cyclical fluctuations and to accelerate economic growth 
(Galli & Padovano, 2002). The Keynesian rationale then implies a deficit reaction function driven by 
variables such as unemployment and output growth rate. 
Second, the optimal finance theory that is in accordance with the Ricardian equivalence proposition. It 
argues that deficits and taxes are equivalent in their effect on consumption, thus debts can be used by 
the government to smooth taxes over time (Barro, 1979). The conditions required for Ricardian 
Equivalence to hold are existence of infinite planning horizons, certainty about future tax burdens, 
perfect capital markets (or absence of borrowing constraints), rational expectations and 
non-distortionary taxes (Mashakada, 2013). Galli and Padovano (2002) argued that fluctuations of tax 
base induced by business cycle need surpluses in upswing periods and deficits during downturn periods 
to keep government expenditures and tax rate constant. 
Third, the government choice theories presented by Galli and Padovano (2002) claim that deficits are 
an equilibrium result of political choices carried out under a set of institutional constraints. Galli and 
Padovano (2002) argued that voters and pressure groups choose debt over taxes to redistribute 
resources in their favor. Hence, changes in the political influence of these groups and in the institutional 
framework where fiscal choices occur set the equilibrium deficit level. The government choice theories 
presented by Galli and Padovano (2002) are the special interest group theory, wars of attrition, and 
political budget cycles. Special interest group theory suggests the identification of interest groups that 
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prefer debt financing and the political influence of such a group in shifting government policy in their 
favor. The special interest groups could be youths, women or the elderly and their political influence 
could increase with their percentage share of the total population. 
In the wars of attrition explanation for fiscal deficits, Galli and Padovano (2002) presented the 
argument by Alesina and Drazen (1991), and Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) that divided or coalition 
governments lead to the creation and persistence of budget deficits. For instance, it is argued that 
decision making in a coalition government has been always a challenge, hence leading to delays in 
fiscal stabilization and accumulation of more debt. In the theory of political budget cycles, it is argued 
that an expansionary fiscal policy before elections may lead to a boom in the economy that voters may 
perceive as a sign of competence of the incumbent government as it seeks re-election (Rogoff, 1990; 
Alesina, Roubini, & Cohen, 1997). Therefore, budget deficits are likely to increase during the election 
periods.  
Finally, is the Olivera-Tanzi effects theory from the work of Olivera (1967) and Tanzi (1977, 1978). 
Olivera (1967) suggested that inflation-induced seigniorage might lower real income tax. Thereafter, 
Tanzi (1977, 1978) analyzed Olivera’s work and supported it. The Olivera-Tanzi effect theory 
postulates that as inflation rises, public expenditure rises while real tax revenue, after adjusting for 
inflation, depreciates hence fuelling the budget deficit problem. The delay in adjustment of tax revenue 
to inflation is influenced by the elasticity of tax with respect to nominal income and length of time 
between an occurrence of taxable event and tax payment (Tanzi, 1978). Given the lag in the collection 
of taxes, the higher the rate of inflation, the lower the real value of tax revenue collected, holding other 
factors constant (Tanzi, 1977, 1978). Aghevli and Khan (1978) showed that public expenditures adjust 
more quickly to inflation than taxes, with the result that the budget deficit is enlarged. 
The reviewed literature identifies economic factors (such as inflation, GDP growth, unemployment rate, 
real exchange rate, openness to international trade and external balance), political economy factors 
(such as political budget cycles, tax reforms, type of government, corruption) and demographic factors 
(such as urbanization) as the underlying factors behind the budget imbalances dynamics witnessed in 
various countries. The most common explanation of the effects of inflation on budget imbalances is 
presented by the Olivera-Tanzi effect proposition and related empirical studies. Olivera (1967) 
modelled an increase in size of budget deficits that results from inflation when public expenditure is 
related to current price level, but government revenues are related to the previous price level, as a result 
of lags in tax collections. Studies thereafter (Aghevli & Khan, 1978; Heller, 1980; Hossain, 1987; 
Diokno, 2007) have found similar results showing that with inflation, public expenditures adjust 
rapidly while at the same time the real value of tax revenue is eroded due to tax collection lags thus 
resulting in an increase in size of budget deficits.  
Economic growth also influences budget imbalances through its impact on government spending and 
tax revenue growth. Cho (2009) posited that there could be a positive relationship between economic 
growth and expansion of government spending based on the assumption that pressure for social 
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progress leads to public sector growth. Cho added that GDP growth influences the budget deficits 
through its impact on growth in tax revenue, which is expected to grow with increases in national 
income. Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) used pooled least squares to estimate the factors behind the budget 
imbalance dynamics for the period 1970-2002 in a panel of OECD countries. They found out that real 
GDP growth, reduced budget deficits in the countries.  
Flexible exchange rate regimes allow macroeconomic effects of unsound public finance policies to 
manifest themselves immediately through movements in exchange rates, hence are said to promote 
fiscal discipline (Cho, 2009). According to Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991) the net effects of real 
exchange rate fluctuations on budget balances relies on the relative weights of traded and non-traded 
items in public expenditure and revenue. A real depreciation of the domestic currency raises public 
expenditure (measured in local currency units) by increasing foreign interest payments and expenditure 
of traded-goods, capital and intermediate goods acquired by the government (Easterly & 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991). On the other hand, a real depreciation boosts government revenue from higher 
surpluses of traded-goods producing firms and from taxation of traded goods (Easterly & 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991). Diokno (2007) argued that considering the fact that the foreign debt accounts 
for about half of total outstanding government debt, it is anticipated that real exchange rates are 
negatively related with budget balances. 
The political economy factors that have been found to influence the budget imbalances are political 
budget cycle, type of government, and corruption in the public sector. During election years, politicians 
pursue expansionary fiscal policies in order to boost the economy in time to secure electoral support 
(Cho, 2009; Tujula & Wolswijk, 2004). According to Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) budget balances on 
average deteriorate by about 0.3 percent of GDP in general election years. Using a sample of 
Sub-Saharan African countries, Block (2002) showed that political business cycles have effects on 
budget balances and public expenditure. Alesina and Tabellini (1990a) showed that the strategic 
interaction between two governments in office at different times could lead to increase in budget 
deficits through accumulation of government debt over what it could be under a benevolent social 
planner. Alesina and Perotti (1994) pointed out that the accumulation of debt by incumbent government 
is higher the less likely it is for it to be re-elected and the greater the disagreement on public 
expenditure composition between the incumbent and the opposition parties.  
Roubini and Sachs (1989) examined the evolution of the size of government and budget deficits in 
OECD economies during the period 1960-1985. They found out that countries, mostly characterized by 
multi-party coalitions and proportional representation voting like Italy and Belgium failed to limit the 
government debt accumulation. They affirmed that budget deficit reduction requires political consensus, 
which is hard to achieve in multi-party coalitions. In their “war-of-attrition” model, Alesina and Drazen 
(1991) noted that delayed stabilizations occur due to too many parties forming the government, which 
render it difficult to reach a consensus on concrete adjustment policies. Thus, broad-based coalition 
governments have more difficulties in committing to a stabilization program than one-party majority 
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rule governments. Before the 2002 general elections, Kenya was governed by a single-majority party 
government (KANU). However, after the elections, National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government 
came into power. This was a coalition government of several parties that came together before the 
elections. After the disputed December 2007 general election until March 2013, Kenya was governed 
by a coalition government consisting of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party of 
National Unity (PNU). These parties came together to form the government after the disputed elections. 
Moreover, following the 2013 general elections, the Jubilee Coalition came into power. However, the 
parties that formed the coalition before the election later on in 2016 dissolved to form the Jubilee Party. 
It is therefore of interest to examine how changing the type of government, especially to the grand 
coalition government of 2008-2013 influenced Kenya’s fiscal balances. 
The other political economy factor which has been found to influence budget imbalances is the level of 
corruption in the public sector. More specifically, corruption within government and low tax 
compliance by its citizens’ influence government spending and tax revenue collection. According to 
Mwakalobo (2015), Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have institutional weaknesses that lead to revenue 
leakages through tax evasion and embezzlement of revenue collected. These impacts negatively on the 
amount of revenue collected and consequently the size of the budget deficit. Gongera et al. (2013) lists 
corruption, unwarranted public expenditure by the government, inability of Kenya Revenue Authority 
to hit its targets and high tax non-compliance rate as factors responsible for the persistent budget 
deficits in Kenya.  
Demographic factors also influence the budget imbalances through the pressure they exert on 
governments to adjust public expenditure to cater for increased demand for public goods and services. 
Painter and Bae (2001) pointed out that the elderly population proportion has a negative relationship 
with state public expenditure, which indicates that the elderly have a lower demand for government 
goods. Youthful populations like the case of Kenya tend to have a higher demand for public goods and 
services than an aging population. This leads to increased pressure for the government to increase 
spending, which worsens the budget deficits.  
The reviewed literature shows that most studies have focused on economic factors without broadly 
incorporating other factors such as political and demographic factors. This paper sought to fill this gap 
by taking a broad view of the factors behind budget imbalance dynamics in Kenya. Additionally, the 
reviewed literature presents a limited focus on Sub-Sahara African countries with only Block (2002) 
and Weeks (2008) focusing their analysis on a sample of Sub-Sahara African countries. The sample by 
Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991) also included a limited number of Sub-Sahara African countries. 
Most of the reviewed studies have made use of samples of OECD countries. In an attempt to fill this 
gap, this paper makes use of country—specific data analysis using a set of simultaneous equations. 
Moreover, empirical studies on Kenya such as Muriithi and Moyi (2003), Wawire (2006, 2017), and 
Gongera et al. (2013) have mainly focused on tax revenue performance. This paper sought to fill this 
gap as well. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
This paper takes a broad view of the budget imbalance dynamics in Kenya since it is based on an 
interaction of theories explaining the relationship between various factors and budget imbalances 
dynamics. However, the paper borrows heavily from empirical studies that have looked at the impact of 
economic factors, specifically inflation, on budget imbalances through two-step effects on the tax 
revenue generation and government spending adjustments. The theoretical underpinning for this paper, 
therefore, is the Olivera-Tanzi effect theory with the assumption that the effect can also take place in a 
low or a moderate inflation economy like Kenya. More specifically, the paper borrows from the 
theoretical framework used by Aghevli and Khan (1978) and Heller (1980), modified to incorporate 
other variables. Aghevli and Khan (1978) analyzed the relationship between inflationary process and 
budget deficits in developing countries. They modelled the public sector by assuming that the 
government’s “desired” real expenditures are related to real income levels (assuming that real income is 
exogenous). This is presented as follows:  
log(𝐺 𝑃⁄ )𝑡
𝑑
=  𝑔0 + 𝑔1𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑌𝑡 ; 0 < 𝑔1                       (1) 
Where log is logarithm, G is nominal government expenditure, P is the price level, d indicates that it’s 
the desired level of real expenditure, t is time variable, Y is real national income, 𝑔1 is real income 
elasticity of government expenditure which is one if the government increases its expenditure 
proportionately with the growth of real income. 
Aghevli and Khan (1978) argued that government attempts to keep its real expenditure constant in the 
face of inflation, thus they specified actual real expenditures to adjust to the difference between desired 
real expenditures and actual real expenditures in the previous period as presented in Equation 2: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐺 𝑃⁄ )𝑡
=  𝜑 [𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐺 𝑃⁄ )𝑡
𝑑
−  𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐺 𝑃⁄ )𝑡−1
]                   (2) 
where 𝜑  is the coefficient of adjustment, 0 < 𝜑 < 1 
Substituting Equation (1) into (2), a solution for level of real expenditures is obtained: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐺 𝑃⁄ )𝑡
=  𝜑𝑔0 +  𝜑𝑔1 log 𝑌𝑡 + (1 − 𝜑) log(
𝐺
𝑃⁄ )𝑡−1
              (3) 
This is a partial adjustment model. However, for this analysis, the dynamism of the model is 
determined by the data used. In nominal terms, Equation (3) is expressed as follows: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑡 = 𝜑𝑔0 +  𝜑𝑔1 log 𝑌𝑡 + (1 − 𝜑){log 𝐺𝑡−1 − log 𝑃𝑡−1} + log 𝑃𝑡         (4) 
Aghevli and Ghan (1978) also assumed that the desired nominal government revenues are functionally 
related to the level of nominal income, thus: 
log 𝑇𝑅𝑡
𝑑 =  𝑡0 + 𝑡1(log 𝑌𝑡 + log 𝑃𝑡) ; 0 < 𝑡1                  (5) 
where TR is the nominal total revenue and 𝑡1 denotes the elasticity of total revenue that is expected to 
be positive. Other variables are as described before. Actual total revenues adjust for the difference 
between desired total revenue and actual total revenue obtained in the previous period; 
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𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑅𝑡 =  𝜏[log 𝑇𝑅𝑡
𝑑 − log 𝑇𝑅𝑡−1]                        (6) 
Where 𝜏 is the coefficient of adjustment, 0 < 𝜏 < 1 
Substituting Equation (5) into (6), an equation for nominal total revenues is obtained:  
log 𝑇𝑅𝑡 =  𝜏𝑡0 + 𝜏𝑡1(log 𝑌𝑡 + log 𝑃𝑡) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑅𝑡−1             (7) 
In this framework, even if at the beginning there is a balanced budget, there will be an increasing 
divergence between expenditure and revenue due to inflation and other factors. The fundamental 
hypothesis is that expenditure tends to adjust to its desired level more rapidly than revenue (Heller, 
1980). Additionally, there could be other economic, institutional and/or political economy factors 
influencing government spending positively while at the same time limiting revenue growth. 
Consequently, these factors lead to an increase in size of the budget deficit. 
3.2 Empirical Models 
In specifying the models for analyzing the budget imbalance dynamics in Kenya, the theoretical 
framework presented by Aghevli and Khan (1978) which has been applied by authors such as Heller 
(1980), Hossain (1987) and Neyapti (2003) was employed. In this analysis, the focus is in the 
adjustments of the budget balance components, which consequently determine the budget imbalance 
dynamics. The empirical model for the analysis of the nominal adjustments in government expenditure 
follows Equation (4) with some modification and is specified as follows: 
Model 1: Government Expenditure Model 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑡 =
𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑓∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡−𝑓 + +
 ∑ 𝛾𝑘∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−𝑘 + ∑ 𝛿𝑙 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝑡−𝑙 + ∑ 𝜗𝑤 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊𝑡−𝑤 + ∑ 𝜋𝑛 ∆ln 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑃𝐼𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜏1 𝐸𝐿𝐶 + 𝜏2 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑇 +
𝜏3 @𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜇𝑡                                                                    (8) 
Where: ∆  is the difference operator; 𝑙𝑛  is the natural log; t denotes time index in quarters 
(2000Q1, …, 2015Q4); 𝛼0  is the autonomous adjustments of the dependent variable; 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑓,  
𝛾𝑘, 𝛿𝑙 , 𝜗𝑤 , 𝜋𝑛, 𝜏1, 𝜏2  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏3  are coefficients; 𝑖, 𝑓, 𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑤, 𝑛  are the lag lengths of the respective 
variables; 𝐺 is nominal government expenditure (including interest payment on government debt); 𝑌 
is nominal national income (nominal GDP); CPI is Consumer Price Indices; 𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅 is Nominal 
Effective Exchange rates; 𝑀𝑊 is nominal minimum wages; 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑃𝐼 is Corruption Perception Index; 
𝐸𝐿𝐶  is election dummy; 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑇  is type of government (takes the value 1 for grand coalition 
government (2008 Q2 to 2013Q1) and 0 otherwise); @𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 used to capture time trend; and 𝜇  is 
stochastic disturbance term.  
Nominal adjustment in government tax revenue follows Equation (7) with some modification and is 
specified as: 
Model 2: Government Tax Revenue Model 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝑡 =
𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑓 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡−𝑓 + +
 ∑ 𝛾𝑘 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−𝑘 + ∑ 𝛿𝑙 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝑡−𝑙 + ∑ 𝜗𝑤 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊𝑡−𝑤 + ∑ 𝜋𝑛 ∆ln 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑃𝐼𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜏1𝐸𝐿𝐶 + 𝜏2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑇 +
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𝜏3 @𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜇𝑡                                                                    (9) 
Where TR is the nominal government tax revenue (excluding non-tax revenue and grants) and the other 
variables and symbols are as defined before in Equation (8).  
Using specifications in Equation (8) and (9), the decision on how a variable influences the budget 
imbalance dynamics is based on the sign and magnitude of the coefficients. Additionally, a model for 
direct analysis of budget imbalance dynamics is specified in order to corroborate the results from the 
first two models. The model for nominal adjustments in budget imbalances is given by: 
Model 3: Budget Imbalance Model 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑏𝑎𝑙,𝑡 =
𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑏𝑎𝑙,𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑓∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡−𝑓 + +
 ∑ 𝛾𝑘 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−𝑘 + ∑ 𝛿𝑙 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝑡−𝑙 + ∑ 𝜗𝑤∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊𝑡−𝑤 + ∑ 𝜋𝑛 ∆ln 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑃𝐼𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜏1𝐸𝐿𝐶 + 𝜏2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑇 +
𝜏3 @𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜇𝑡                                                                   (10) 
Where 𝐵𝑏𝑎𝑙 is the nominal budget balance (which can be a deficit or a surplus in a quarter). The other 
variables and symbols are as defined before in Equation (8). 
3.3 Definitions of Variables and Expected Results 
The dependent variables in this analysis are nominal adjustments in aggregate government expenditure, 
total government revenue and budget balance. Change variables are used since the main focus is to see 
how the various variables influence budget imbalance dynamics. Natural log of nominal government 
expenditure (𝐿𝑛𝐺) is the natural logarithm of total national government expenditure, including interest 
payment on government debt in a quarter. Natural log of nominal government tax revenue (LnTR) is the 
natural logarithm of total quarterly nominal government tax revenue (excluding non-tax revenue and 
grants).  
Natural log of nominal budget balance (𝐵𝑏𝑎𝑙) is the natural logarithm of quarterly total current 
government spending plus the interest payment on outstanding debts minus the total tax revenue 
(excluding non-tax revenue and grants). Since most of the quarterly budget balances take negative 
(deficit) figures, their log transformation follows the formulae employed by Busse and Hefeker (2007) 
in log transforming negative numbers, which is: 
𝑦 = ln {𝑥 + √(𝑥2 +  1)}                           (11) 
Where x captures the budget balance (deficit) figures. Since the budget balances are in the billions and 
trillions, one trillion (1,000,000,000,000) figure is used in the formulae instead of 1.  
Natural log of nominal national income (𝐿𝑛𝑌) is the natural logarithm of quarterly nominal Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). Natural log of consumer price index (LnCPI) is the natural logarithm of 
consumer price index used to capture the general price levels in the economy and the effects of 
inflation on budget imbalances. 
Natural log of nominal effective exchange rates (NEER) is the natural logarithm of a weighted average 
of the Kenya Shilling (KSh) relative to a basket of the trading partners’ currencies, weighted in 
accordance with the importance of the issuing countries as a trade partner. NEER is not adjusted for the 
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effects of inflation and is reported annually by UNCTAD hence the data is converted to quarterly time 
series data using Eviews. The index base for the NEER data used in the analysis is the year 2000.  
Natural log of nominal minimum wages (LnMW) is the natural logarithm of nominal values of gazetted 
monthly basic minimum wages in urban areas (Nairobi, Kisumu, Mombasa), excluding house 
allowances. These cities have a relatively high concentration of public servants hence the decision to 
use their minimum wages instead of that in the agricultural industry. 
Natural log of corruption perception index (LnCorPI) is the natural logarithm of the corruption 
perception index for Kenya, reported by Transparency International. A country’s score represents the 
perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Increase 
in perceived public sector corruption levels is represented by decline in corruption perception index 
score. 
Election dummy (ELC) captures the influence of the political business cycle. It takes the value 1 for a 
period where there were general elections (that is, three quarters before and including the quarter when 
the election is held) and 0 for a period when there were no general elections. The dummy is defined for 
the period before the elections since the interest is to capture the effects of pre-election fiscal 
manipulations.  
Type of government (GovT) is used in the models to capture the influence of the composition of the 
government on budget imbalances. It takes the value 1 for the grand coalition government (formed in 
March 2008 after the 2007 post-election violence—ruled until March 2013) and 0 otherwise.  
3.4 Data Sources and Type 
This paper utilizes secondary time series data for the period 2000 Quarter 1 to 2015 Quarter 4. The 
quarterly data on government expenditure, national income (GDP at market prices), Consumer Price 
Index, interest payment on government debt was obtained from the Central Bank of Kenya and Kenya 
National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS). Quarterly tax revenue data were obtained from Kenya Revenue 
Authority, whereas minimum wage data was obtained from the Kenya Economic Surveys published by 
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. Data for nominal effective exchange rates was obtained from 
UNCTAD (2017) online statistics. Public sector corruption perception indices data was obtained from 
the Transparency International’s annual reports on Kenya. The annual data for nominal effective 
exchange rate and corruption perception indices were transformed into a quarterly data using Eviews 
statistical software to conform to the data structure of the other variables.  
 
4. Results and Discussions 
4.1 Diagnostic Tests Results 
Test for presence of unit roots in the series was carried out using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), 
Philips-Perron (PP) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests. Before performing the 
diagnostic tests, the trend of the variables was determined. The results of the unit root tests show that 
election dummy (ELC) is integrated of order zero, whereas the log of nominal government expenditure 
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(LnG), log of nominal tax revenue (LnTR), log of budget balances (LnBbal), log of national income 
(LnY), log of consumer price index (LnCPI), log of nominal effective exchange rate (LnNEER), log of 
nominal minimum wages (LnMW), log of corruption perception index (LnCorPI), and government type 
(GovT) are integrated of order one.  
Heteroskedasticity test was carried out using Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Test with the null hypothesis of 
no heteroskedasticity. The results showed that there is no heteroskedasticity in the models. Additionally, 
the results for serial correlation test, which was carried out using the LM test, concluded that there is 
serial correlation among the variables included in all the three models. Multicollinearity test which 
detects the existence of a high correlation among independent variables was also carried out. Results of 
correlation analysis show that the log of national income (LnY) is highly correlated with most of the 
variables. Therefore, the variable is dropped from the models to correct for multicollinearity. 
To test for structural break in the data series, multiple breakpoint tests were applied to identify periods 
of possible structural breaks in the data series and then Chow breakpoint test was applied on the 
periods identified by the former test to confirm its significance. The results showed that for the 
government expenditure model, there are no break dates whereas for government tax revenue and 
budget imbalances models there are break dates in 2012Q1 and 2004Q4 respectively. The Chow 
Breakpoint test showed that the 2012Q1 break point was insignificant whereas the 2004Q4 breakpoint 
was found to be significant. This breakpoint was captured in the model by the dummy variable for 
political budget cycle, capturing the period preceding the 2005 national referendum on change in 
constitution. 
4.2 ARDL Bounds Cointegration Test and Model Selection 
Since the variables are not integrated of the same order, the Johansen cointegration procedure cannot be 
applied in testing for cointegration in the models. Consequently, Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) model developed by Pesaran et al. (2001) is employed. The Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL), also known as Bounds Testing, methodology of Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran et al. 
(2001) can be used with a mixture of data series that are integrated of order zero or one, and the variables 
can enter the model at different lag-lengths. However, none of the variables should be integrated of order 
two.  
To determine the appropriate lag structure before carrying out the Cointegration test, the study made 
use of Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), and 
Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC) lag-order selection statistics. The lower the AIC, SBIC 
or HQIC value the better the model. The results found an optimal lag length of 4 for government 
expenditure model, optimal lag length of 8 for the government tax revenue model and optimal lag length 
of 4 for the budget imbalances model. 
To test for Cointegration, Bound testing was then carried out where coefficient diagnostics for the level 
lagged variables was done using F-Test. The null hypothesis of the test is that there is no long-run 
equilibrium relationship (cointegration) between the variables. That is, H0: θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = θ5 = 0. 
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The computed F-statistic was compared with the tabulated Pesaran Critical values at the five percent 
level of significance for a model with unrestricted intercept and unrestricted trend. Pesaran et al. (2001) 
present a lower bound which is based on the assumption that all of the variables are integrated of order 
zero, I (0), and an upper bound based on the assumption that all of the variables are integrated of order 
one, I (1). As a crosscheck, Bounds t-test of H0: θ1 = 0, against H1: θ1 < 0 was performed. Table 1 presents 
the ARDL Bounds cointegration test results. 
 
Table 1. ARDL Bounds Cointegration Test Results 
 
Government 
Expenditure Model (1) 
Government Tax 
Revenue Model (2) 
Budget Imbalance 
Model (3) 
Specification 
Unrestricted intercept 
and unrestricted trend;  
k = 5 
Unrestricted intercept 
and unrestricted 
trend; k = 5 
Unrestricted intercept 
and unrestricted 
trend; k = 5 
F-statistic 15.9726  11.9560 738.5547 
Pesaran Critical Values 
at 5 percent Level of 
Significance 
Lower 
Bound 
3.12 3.12 3.12 
Upper 
Bound 
4.25 4.25 4.25 
t-statistic -8.8623 -7.6156 -58.8581 
Pesaran Critical Values 
at 5 percent Level of 
Significance 
Lower 
Bound 
-3.41 -3.41 -3.41 
Upper 
Bound 
-4.52 -4.52 -4.52 
Conclusion Cointegrated Cointegrated  Cointegrated 
Source: Authors (2018). 
 
The results show that the F-statistics for all the three models are greater than the Upper Bound Pesaran’s 
critical values, thus the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected. Results for the Bounds t-test also 
show that in absolute terms, t-statistics of the three models are greater than Upper Bound Pesaran’s 
critical values at 5 percent significance level. These results show that the variables have a long run 
relationship. In view of these results, a long-run level model as well as an Error Correction Model (ECM) 
is estimated to measure the long-run equilibrating relationship and the short-run dynamic effects. 
4.3 Efficiency and Dynamic Stability of the Models  
The test for serial correlation was carried out to confirm if the errors are serially independent. This is a 
key requirement for ARDL model efficiency. Additionally, the Jarque-Bera test was used to determine 
the normality of the residuals, with the null hypothesis that residuals are normally distributed. The 
results are presented in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Results of Tests for Models’ Efficiency 
Test Government 
Expenditure Model (1) 
Government Tax 
Revenue Model (2)  
Budget Imbalance 
Model (3)  
Conclusion 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Serial Correlation LM 
Test (F-statistic) 
0.4317 
 
2.4415 0.4408 No serial correlation 
Jarque-Bera Normality 
Test (Test-statistic) 
1.7328 1.9192 0.1240 Residuals are 
normally distributed 
Note. *, **, *** Denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level 
of significance, respectively. 
Source: Authors (2018). 
 
The results show that the residuals in the models are serially independent and normally distributed, 
which is desirable for their specification. Further, the dynamic stability of the models was tested using 
the CUSUM test and the AR roots graphs. The null hypothesis in CUSUM test is that the parameters 
are stable (which is desirable). The results for the CUSUM test are presented in the following figures.  
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Figure 2. Result of CUSUM Test for Stability of the Government Expenditure Model 
Source: Authors (2018). 
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Figure 3. Result of CUSUM Test for Stability of the Government Tax Revenue Model 
Source: Authors (2018). 
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Figure 4. Result of CUSUM Test for Stability of the Budget Imbalance Model 
Source: Authors (2018). 
 
The results of CUSUM test for stability in Figures 2-4 show that the models are dynamically stable 
since the CUSUM statistics (blue lines) lay within the bands. This implies that the models are steady 
and reliable in explaining the relationships the dependent and the explanatory variables.  
For the AR roots graphs, an estimated model is stable (stationary) if all roots have modulus less than 
one and lie inside the unit circle. The AR roots graphs, which report the inverse roots of the 
characteristic AR polynomial, are presented in the following figures.  
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Figure 5. AR Roots Graph for Government Expenditure Model 
Source: Authors (2018). 
 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
 
Figure 6. AR Roots Graph for Government Tax Revenue Model 
Source: Authors (2018). 
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Figure 7. AR Roots Graph for Budget Imbalance Model 
Source: Authors (2018). 
 
The AR roots graphs in Figures 5 and 7 show that in the government expenditure and budget imbalance 
models, some roots lie on the unit circle, which implies that even though the systems are stable, they 
are likely to have a random walk/process with time. This may weaken the validity of the standard errors 
with time. The AR roots graph in Figure 6 shows that for the government tax revenue model, all roots 
have modulus less than one and lie within the unit circle. This implies that the process is bounded or 
forced around a trend thus is stable and is not likely to have a random walk with time. That is, the 
standard errors remain valid even with a larger period.  
Using the pairwise Granger causality test, the causality between the variables is tested and the results of 
the test are presented in the Table 4 in the appendix. The results show that change in log of consumer 
price index (∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑃𝐼) granger causes change in log of government tax revenue (∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅) at the five 
percent levels of significance. The results also show that change in log of consumer price index 
(∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑃𝐼) does not granger cause change in log of budget balance (∆𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑏𝑎𝑙) at the second lag level 
where it enters the budget imbalance model. However, a further test of granger causality between the 
two variables at fourth lag level, where the variable enters the government expenditure and tax revenue 
model, reveals that change in log of budget balance (∆𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑏𝑎𝑙) instead granger causes change in log of 
consumer price index (∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑃𝐼) (see Table 5 in the appendix). This is an indication that the methods of 
financing Kenya’s budget deficits could be partly inflationary.  
4.4 Discussion of the Regression Results  
The Error Correction Model regression results for the three models used to analyze the fiscal 
imbalances dynamics are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. ARDL ECM Regression results for Analysis of Budget Imbalance Dynamics  
 Government 
Expendituure Model  
Government Tax 
Revenue Model  
Budget Imbalance 
Model 
Regressors Dependent Variable: 
Change in log of 
government expenditure 
(∆𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑡) 
Dependent Variable: 
Change in log of 
government tax revenue 
(∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝑡) 
Dependent Variable: 
Change in log of 
budget balance 
(∆𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑏𝑎𝑙,𝑡) 
Change in log of government expenditure, lagged 
twice (∆𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑡−2) 
0.2870 (0.1917) - - 
Change in log of government tax revenue, lagged 
twice (∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝑡−2) 
- 0.3678*** (0.0658) - 
Change in log of budget balance, lagged once 
(∆𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑏𝑎𝑙,𝑡−1) 
- - -0.1277 (0.0833) 
Change in log consumer price index (∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡) -  -  9.7729** (4.5629) 
Change in log of consumer price index, lagged 
twice (∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−2) 
- - 8.4025* (4.6807) 
Change in log of consumer price index, lagged 
four times (∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−4) 
9.2574 (6.0788) -0.9700** (0.4164) - 
Change in log of nominal effective exchange rate, 
lagged three times (∆𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝑡−3) 
- 0.2620 (0.3806) 4.3719 (4.2718) 
Change in log of nominal effective exchange rate, 
lagged four times (∆𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝑡−4) 
1.3653 (5.6298) - - 
Change in log of minimum wages (∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊𝑡) - - 13.5752*** (2.4678) 
Change in log of minimum wages, lagged once 
(∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊𝑡−1) 
6.1093* (3.1982) - - 
Change in log of minimum wages, lagged twice 
(∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊𝑡−2) 
14.0827*** (4.6792) - - 
Change in log of minimum wages, lagged three 
quarters (∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊𝑡−3) 
- 0.9430*** (0.2197) - 
Change in log of minimum wages, lagged four 
quarters (∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊𝑡−4) 
- - 13.6265*** (2.7829) 
Change in log of corruption perception index, 
lagged once (∆ln 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑃𝐼𝑡−1) 
-4.2191 (5.9250) - - 
Change in log of corruption perception index, 
lagged twice (∆ln 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑃𝐼𝑡−2) 
- - -6.7946* (3.6277) 
Change in log of corruption perception index, 
lagged three quarters (∆ln 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑃𝐼𝑡−3) 
- -0.0376 (0.3280) - 
Election dummy (ELCt)  -0.2727 (0.2537) 0.0157 (0.0184) 0.3090* (0.1806) 
Government Type (GovTt)  -0.6949** (0.3428) 0.0150 (0.0196) -0.3317 (0.2169) 
Constant Term -0.4926 (0.3430) 0.0272 (0.0224) -1.1482*** (0.2841) 
Error correction term (𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1) -1.1399*** (0.2361) -1.0307*** (0.1667) -0.4876*** (0.1698) 
Time trend (@𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑) 0.0104 (0.0101) -0.0006 (0.0007) 0.0067 (0.0073) 
Number of Observations 52 48 49 
F-statistic 5.7616*** 36.5099*** 27.6321*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4828 0.8718 0.8592 
Note. Level of significance are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. The figures inside the 
parentheses are robust standard errors. 
Source: Authors (2018). 
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The variables enter the respective models at different lag levels and the F-tests show that the 
coefficients are jointly significant in explaining the sample variations in government expenditure, tax 
revenue and budget deficits. At one percent level of significance, the coefficients of all the error 
correction terms included in the three models were found to be negative and significant. This implies 
that at one percent significance level, the systems in the government expenditure, government tax 
revenue and budget imbalance models adjusts towards long run equilibrium at a speed of 113.99 
percent, 103.07 percent and 48.76 percent respectively. It is worth noting that the government 
expenditure model adjusts quickly to its long run equilibrium than the tax revenue model. This partly 
explains the persistent widening of the government expenditure—tax revenue gap witnessed during the 
study period. 
Since the variables included in the models are expressed as logarithms, except the election dummy and 
government type dummy, their coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. The empirical results show that 
the lagged dependent variables do not influence the changes in the current dependent variables except 
for the government tax revenue. The results show that at the one percent level of significance, a 
percentage increase in nominal government tax revenue (lagged twice) would lead to a 0.37 percent 
rise in current nominal government tax revenue.  
Inflation, which is captured in the models by the changes in log of consumer price indices, was found 
to have a positive but an insignificant coefficient in the government expenditure model. However, the 
coefficient of change in log of consumer price index was found to be significant in the government tax 
revenue and budget imbalance models. The results show that at the five percent level of significance, a 
percentage rise in the consumer price index (lagged four quarters) would lead to a 0.97 percent decline 
in nominal government tax revenue. On the other hand, at the five percent level of significance, a 
percentage rise in current period’s consumer price index would lead to a 9.77 percent increase in 
nominal budget imbalances (deficits) whereas at 10 percent significance level, a percentage rise in the 
consumer price index (lagged four quarters) would lead to 8.40 percent increase in the nominal budget 
imbalances (deficits). This is a combined effect of approximately 18.17 percent increase in nominal 
budget deficit in a year. These results support the findings of Aghevli and Khan (1978), Heller (1980), 
Hossain (1987) and Diokno (2007) who found out that government expenditure adjust more quickly to 
inflation than tax revenue, with the result that the budget deficit is enlarged. These results also provide 
an empirical support to the results of Gongera et al. (2013) who noted that inflation heavily contributes 
to budget deficits in Kenya.  
Looking back at the Granger causality test in the previous section, which revealed that change in log of 
budget balance Granger causes change in log of consumer price index at the fourth lag level, it can be 
pointed out that the financing of the annual nominal budget deficits in the country is partly inflationary 
in nature. The empirical results and the Granger causality test results are suggestive of a possible 
Olivera-Tanzi effect, which postulates that as inflation rises, government expenditure rises while real 
tax revenue, after adjusting for inflation, depreciates hence fuelling the budget deficit problem (Olivera, 
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1967; Tanzi, 1977, 1978).  
The nominal minimum wages were found to have a positive influence on government expenditure, 
government tax revenue and budget imbalances. Nominal minimum wages were used in the models to 
capture the influence of the frequent wage adjustments to the budget imbalance dynamics in Kenya. 
The results showed that at the one percent level of significance, a percentage rise in nominal minimum 
wages (lagged once) would lead to a 14.08 percent increase in nominal government expenditure, 
whereas at the 10 percent level of significance, a percentage increase in nominal minimum wages 
would lead to a 6.11 percent increase in government expenditure. For the government tax revenue and 
budget imbalance models, the results show that at the one percent level of significance, a percentage 
increase in nominal minimum wages (lagged three quarters) would lead to an increase in nominal 
government tax revenue by 0.94 percent, whereas a percentage increase in nominal minimum wages 
(lagged four quarters) would lead to a 13.62 percent increase in nominal budget deficits (that is, worsen 
the budget imbalances).   
The variable used to capture corruption in the public sector (corruption perception index) was found to 
have a negative coefficient in all the models, but the coefficient was only significant in the budget 
imbalance model. A decrease in the corruption perception index implies an increase in the perceived 
public sector corruption level. Therefore, the negative coefficient shows that a percentage rise in 
corruption levels in the public sector would lead to a 6.97 percent increase in nominal budget deficits 
(worsen the budget imbalances) within three quarters of a year. The result supports the arguments by 
Mwakalobo (2015) who found out that the institutional weaknesses in Kenya lead to tax revenue 
leakages through tax evasion, non-tax compliance and revenue embezzlement which impacts 
negatively on the amount of tax revenue collected, consequently worsening the budget deficits.  
The election dummy variable (read political budget cycles) was found to have an insignificant 
coefficient in the government expenditure and the government tax revenue model but a positive 
significant coefficient in the budget imbalance model. The results show that at the 10 percent level of 
significance, an occurrence of a general election would lead to a 0.31 percent increase in nominal 
budget deficits. The result supports the findings of Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) that budget imbalances 
on average worsen by about 0.3 percent of GDP in general election years.  
Change in government type (GovT) into a grand coalition government from March 2008 to March 2013 
was found to have a negative effect on the nominal government spending, but no effect on government 
tax revenue and nominal budget balances. The results show that the change of government from that, 
led by Party of National Unity (PNU) into a grand coalition government with the Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM) led to a 0.69 percent decline in nominal government spending. This result is 
suggestive of improved fiscal discipline during the grand coalition government days. However, the 
results are contrary to the argument by Cho (2009) that one-party majority governments are more likely 
to maintain tighter fiscal discipline than coalition governments. Though insignificant, the negative 
coefficient of the type of government dummy in the budget imbalance model is in line with the wars of 
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attrition model explanation for fiscal deficit presented by Galli and Padovano (2002), Alesina and 
Drazen (1991), and Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999). The other variable included in the model, that is, 
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) was found to have a positive but an insignificant coefficient in 
all the three models. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations  
The study shows that the system in the government expenditure model adjusts quickly to its long run 
equilibrium than the tax revenue model, partly explaining the persistent growth in budget imbalances 
(deficits) in Kenya. Whereas the consumer price index has a positive insignificant coefficient in the 
government expenditure model, the empirical results show that at the five percent level of significance, 
a percentage rise in the consumer price index (lagged four quarters) leads to 0.97 percent erosion of the 
nominal value of government tax revenue. Consequently, this leads to an increase in the budget deficits 
as indicated by the budget imbalance model, which shows that a percentage rise in the consumer price 
index has a combined effect of approximately 18.17 percent increase in nominal budget deficits in a 
year. Together with the Granger causality results which showed that change in the log of nominal 
budget balances Granger causes change in log of consumer price index at the fourth lag level (in a year), 
the results indicate that the Olivera-Tanzi effect proposition can be used to explain the budget 
imbalance dynamics in the Kenyan economy. The fact that Kenya is not a high inflation economy like 
the economies where the Olivera-Tanzi effect has been experienced before puts to question the 
assertion that the proposition only applies to high inflation economies. The empirical results show that 
increase in the general price levels in the economy (captured in the models by change in log of 
consumer price indices), upward adjustment of nominal minimum wages, rise in perceived levels of 
corruption in the public sector and an occurrence of a general election in the country worsen the budget 
imbalances (deficits) in Kenya. These variables consequently act as constraints to the fiscal 
consolidation efforts in the country as they worsen the fiscal deficits. 
From the findings, the study recommends measures to reduce the fiscal imbalance gap in Kenya. First, 
there is a need for more concerted efforts on both supply and demand sides of the economy to check the 
inflationary pressure in the country. This is because the changes in general price levels in the economy 
were found to substantially worsen the nominal budget imbalances (deficits) in Kenya. Domestic 
production of consumer products needs to be enhanced and the supply side constraints that lead to 
inadequate supply of food items and other consumer products need to be addressed. Additionally, the 
expansionary fiscal stance that creates inflationary pressure on the demand side of the economy needs 
to be checked. More of the government resources should be devoted to the supply side’s productive 
public expenditure aimed at reducing the cost of doing business and enhancing production in the key 
sectors of the economy.  
Second, decisive and punitive actions need to be taken to reduce the perceived level of corruption in 
Kenya’s public sector. This is because the study shows that rent-seeking behaviour in the public sector 
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worsens the budget imbalances (deficits) in the country. There is a need for more focus on ensuring 
value for money spent on infrastructural development projects among other development projects in the 
country. The fight on corruption should focus on the over-pricing of mega infrastructural projects in the 
country. For instance, the expenditures of constructing a kilometre of road should be standardized 
across the country. The same should apply to other infrastructural projects. Corruption tends to 
compromise the quality and value for money spent on the development projects. Indeed, rent seeking 
behaviour of the public officers and tax evasion are challenges that need to be dealt with decisively in 
controlling unproductive public expenditure and enhancing domestic revenue mobilisation in the 
country. 
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Appendix  
Table 4. Pairwise Granger Causality Test Results  
 
Government 
Expenditure Model  
Government Tax 
Revenue Model  
Budget Imbalance 
Model  
 
Dependent variable = 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐺 
Dependent variable = 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅 
Dependent variable = 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑏𝑎𝑙 
Variables and Direction of 
Causality 
Lag 
length 
F-Statistics 
Lag 
length 
F-Statistics 
Lag 
length 
F-Statistics 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑃𝐼 → 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 4 0.7033 4 2.9728** 2 1.0326 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 → ∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑃𝐼 4 2.0813 4 1.7091 2 0.3581 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅 → 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 4 0.4041 3 0.7466 3 3.8136** 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 → ∆𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅 4 0.1250 3 0.4919 3 0.0331 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊 → 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 2 2.1404 3 5.2829*** 4 9.1553*** 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 → ∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊 2 0.2302 3 12.3760*** 4 0.2186 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑃𝐼 → 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 1 0.0054 3 0.3703 2 0.0504 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 → ∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑃𝐼 1 0.0047 3 0.5647 2 0.0025 
𝐸𝐿𝐶 → 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 1 0.1052 1 1.4701 1 0.0998 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 → 𝐸𝐿𝐶 1 3.2970* 1 0.2959 1 3.4502* 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑇 → 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 1 0.0083 1 0.0102 1 0.0112 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 → 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑇 1 0.0002 1 0.2409 1 0.0003 
Note. The null hypothesis is that variable X does not Granger cause variable Y. *, **, *** Denote the 
rejection of the null hypothesis at 10 percent, 5 percent, 1 percent level of significance, respectively. 
Source: Authors (2018). 
 
Table 5. Pairwise Granger Causality Tests for ∆𝒍𝒏𝑪𝑷𝑰 and ∆𝒍𝒏𝑩𝒃𝒂𝒍 
Date: 05/21/17      Time: 13:12 
Sample: 2000Q1 2015Q2  
Lags: 4   
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑃𝐼 does not Granger Cause ∆𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑏𝑎𝑙 L 51 1.31363 0.2806 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑏𝑎𝑙 does not Granger Cause ∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑃𝐼 2.89217 0.0334 
Source: Authors (2018). 
 
